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I. THE CHALLENGE
Foreign critics sometimes accuse Americans of taking a hypocritical
stance on international law. They say we preach an ethical international law to
others, but practice a selfishly utilitarian international law ourselves. Here is the
remarkable opinion, given just last year, of a leading European international
lawyer. Martti Koskenniemi, a distinguished Finnish scholar, is Professor of
International Law at the University of Helsinki and a Global Professor of Law at
New York University. Koskenniemi believes that the Europeans speak "the lan-
guage of universal international law," but:
How differently the Americans see the world! Legalization, is
just a policy choice, a matter of costs and benefits - with no a
priori reason to believe that the latter would outweigh the for-
mer. And no real obligation to obey international law, just a
weak maxim of prudence. The international law professor is an
almost extinct species at United States law schools. And why
not? In his widely read pamphlet, Robert D. Kaplan called for
leadership with a pagan ethos. "The moral basis of our foreign
policy will depend upon the character of our nation and its lead-
West Virginia University College of Law, The 15th Annual Charles L. Ihlenfeld Lecture on
Public Policy and Ethics, March 23, 2006.
William F. Starr Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law
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ers, not upon the absolutes of international law." Nur der, der
Kann, darf auch wrote Erich Kaufmann in 1911 from within
another Empire. U.S. attitudes to law read like the imperial au-
thoritarianism of early twentieth-century Germany.'
Less vehement, but equally challenging, is this opinion, also within the
last year, of Alfred van Staden, the accomplished Dutch scholar and Professor
of International Relations at Leiden University:
One of the core elements in the fashionable criticism of con-
temporary American foreign policy is the putative lack of
commitment by the US administration to the tenets of interna-
tional law. [C]ritics tirelessly point to the long list of treaties the
US has rejected in spite of the overwhelming support from other
countries: the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the
Landmines Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, the Biological Diversity Treaty, the
Law of the Sea Treaty, and the proposed Protocol to the Bio-
logical Weapons Convention. In addition to the abrogation of
the ABM Treaty, for a long time widely regarded as a show-
piece of classical bilateral arms control, the US is blamed for
having undermined a series of multilateral treaties. Cited ex-
amples are its use of reservations to the Civil and Political
Rights Covenant and the Race Convention (to ensure that no
change in US law and practice would be required), its enact-
ment of implementing legislation for the Chemical Weapons
Convention (aimed at limitations on verifications efforts by the
OPCW), and its failure to comply with its obligations under Ar-
ticle VI of the NPT to pursue nuclear disarmament. On top of
that, the decision of the Bush administration in March 2003 to
resort to military force, without explicit authorization of the UN
Security Council, against the regime of Saddam Hussein was
castigated by many commentators as an unjustified blow to the
effectiveness of the UN Charter.
The contention has been made that the prevailing American ap-
proach to international law is such that it defines this corpus of
law basically in terms of private contractual relationships. In-
ternational law is not seen as a value in its own right that is
conducive to transforming the international system from rela-
tively anarchical patterns of state interactions to a society of na-
tions (or even a global society) unified by common bonds.
Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, 16 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 113, 117-18 (2005) (citations omitted).
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Rather, it is perceived as a vehicle to serve national policy
2goals.
This lecture is a response to answer such foreign critiques. My thesis is
that Americans have long been inclined to both morality and utility in interna-
tional law and that both inclinations are equally genuine. We are not inherently
hypocritical. The truth is more complex. Americans hold and promote both
moral and practical values, albeit we sometimes delude ourselves that what is
useful in international law is good, and what is good in international law is use-
ful.
A preliminary observation. An easy way to begin to understand the
American stance on international law is to observe that all of us do not hold the
same position respecting the discipline. We Americans have many different
views. In large measure, our mixed international law position is the result not of
hypocrisy but of cacophony. There are, for example, the practicing lawyers
acquainted with the international law of treaties and custom, available as rules
of decision in state and federal courts. There is our government and its diplo-
mats, who represent the international legal positions of the United States in our
foreign relations. There are the scholars and jurists, like myself, who read about
and attempt to influence legal precedent and doctrine. And, there are the utopi-
ans, those who wish to employ international law to fashion a better world.
In what follows, I turn to over two hundred years of American involve-
ment with international law. My focus is on our quest for an ethical interna-
tional law. I draw upon some of the work already published in the first volume
of my intellectual history of American international law -- The American Tradi-
tion of International Law: Great Expectations 1789-19143 -- and add some new
thoughts from a work in progress, a second volume of The American Tradition
devoted to the period after 1914. In response to the challenge posed by our
European friends, I emphasize five important American contributions to an ethi-
cal, rather than a strictly utilitarian, international law: (1) James Kent and the
ethics of the efficacy of international law; (2) David Low Dodge, Noah Worces-
ter, and William Ladd and the ideal of an international court; (3) Elihu Burritt
and the origins of the international peace movement; and (4) Woodrow Wilson
and the fight for the League of Nations.
II. JAMES KENT AND THE ETHICS OF THE EFFICACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the early decades of the New Republic, when lawyers commanded
the heights of America's political and intellectual terrain, no jurist was more
generally revered than James Kent (1763-1847), Chancellor of the State of New
2 Alfred van Staden, 52 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 501 (2005) (reviewing J.F. MURPHY, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (2004)).
3 MARK WESTON JANIS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: GREAT
EXPECTATIONS 1789-1914 (2004) [hereinafter JANIS, GREAT EXPECTATIONS].
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York and Professor of Law at Columbia.4 Kent's lasting contribution to the
United States was a monumental four volume work based on his law school
lectures, Commentaries on American Law (1826-1830), the first great American
law treatise. Like the Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-1769) of
William Blackstone (1723-1780), 5 Kent's Commentaries ordered the chaos of
judge-made law and gave common lawyers an intellectual and professional dis-
cipline rigorous enough to meet the tests of a new age. Kent's Commentaries,
often revised, remained a staple in the educational diet of American lawyers
well into the nineteenth century.6
It was of no small moment then that Kent in his rendering of American
law gave international law pride of place. Kent's Commentaries began with 200
pages devoted to the law of nations His first volume commenced with an in-
augural paragraph which reverentially intertwined international law, a term first
introduced in a 1789 publication by Jeremy Bentham, 8 with the American Revo-
lution. Kent defined and praised the discipline, and presciently remarked on
imperfections that would engage American international lawyers for years to
come:
When the United States ceased to be a part of the British em-
pire, and assumed the character of an independent nation, they
became subject to that system of rules which reason, morality,
and custom had established among the civilized nations of
Europe, as their public law. During the war of the American
revolution, Congress claimed cognizance of all matters arising
upon the law of nations, and they professed obedience to that
law, "according to the general usages of Europe." By this law
4 PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL
WAR 109-10, 145-46 (1965).
5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE OF THE
FIRST EDITION OF 1765-1769 (Univ. of Chicago Press ed., 1979).
6 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 290 (1 st ed. 1974).
7 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN Law 1-200 (New York, Halsted 2d ed.)
(1832) [hereinafter KENT, AMERICAN LAW]. Kent's importance, at least with respect to interna-
tional law, was by no means limited to the United States. In 1866, John Thomas Abdy, an English
barrister and Cambridge Professor of Laws, revised Kent's 200 pages about international law for a
separate English edition and assented to the assessment of Kent "as the greatest jurist whom this
age has produced, whose writings may safely be said to be never wrong." J T Abdy, Preface to
Kent's Commentary on International Law, at vi (J.T. Abdy ed., 1st ed. 1866). Abdy's Kent went
into a second and revised English edition twelve years later. KENT'S COMMENTARY ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW (J.T. Abdy ed., 2d ed. 1878).
8 "International law" as a term first appeared in Bentham's Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation and was not originally synonymous with the traditional notion of the law
of nations. M. W. Janis, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of 'International Law,' 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 405 (1984). However, by the early ninteenth century, Americans, like others, were begin-
ning to employ the law of nations and international law interchangeably; Kent was no exception.
See, e.g., KENT, AMERICAN LAW, supra note 7, at 4, 6, 20.
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we are to understand that code of public instruction, which de-
fines the rights and prescribes the duties of nations, in their in-
tercourse with each other. The faithful observance of this law is
essential to national character, and to the happiness of mankind.
According to the observation of Montesquieu, it is founded on
the principle, that different nations ought to do each other as
much good in peace, and as little harm in war, as possible,
without injury to their true interest. But, as the precepts of this
code are not defined in every case with perfect precision, and as
nations have no common civil tribunal to resort to for the inter-
pretation and execution of this law, it is often very difficult to
ascertain, to the satisfaction of the parties concerned, its precise
injunctions and extent; and a still greater difficulty is the want
of adequate pacific means to secure obedience to its dictates.9
The prominence of international law in Kent's Commentaries had little
or nothing to do with the then already familiar English common law rule that the
law of nations was, as Blackstone had put it, "adopted in its full extent by the
common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land."10 Albeit, at least as
early as 1784, American courts recognized the adoption rule," a recognition
more or less acknowledged by Kent: "England and the United States have been
equally disposed to acknowledge the authority of the works of jurists, writing
professedly on public law, and the binding force of the general usage and prac-
tice or nations, and the still greater respect due to judicial decisions recognizing
and enforcing the law of nations.'' 2 However, then, as now, the incorporation
and application of the law of nations by municipal judges made up only a small
fraction of the cases arising before the courts, a relative unimportance reflected
by Blackstone who put his principal discussion of the law of nations and the
adoption rule deep in his fourth and final volume.
1 3
Instead of dealing with the law of nations at the outset as did Kent,
Blackstone began his treatise with an "Introduction" which set the common law
of England upon "two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revela-
tion", 14 a deification of the English common law that outraged his demystifying
9 KENT, AMERICAN LAW, supra note 7, at 1-2.
10 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 67.
11 See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784).
12 KENT, AMERICAN LAW, supra note 7, at 19.
13 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 66-73.
14 Id.; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 42. In Blackstone's "Introduction" the law of nations
had only a fleeting appearance as a law regulating the "mutual intercourse" of different societies
and depending "entirely upon the rules of natural law, or upon mutual compacts, treaties, leagues,
and agreements between these several communities." Id.
20071
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Oxford pupil, Jeremy Bentham.15 Equally, Kent outraged the Harvard historian,
Perry Miller, who complained that Kent made a "fantastic effort" to "translate"
the law of nature into the law of nations so as to cover the common law with
"the canopy of Christianity." 
16
Put into perspective, however, Kent's Christianizing was a form of
moralizing, and not at all fantastic. It began early on in his text as Kent ex-
plored "a difference of opinion among writers, concerning the foundation of the
law of nations."1 7 Kent contrasted the views of positivists who looked to a "sys-
tem of positive institutions, founded upon consent and usage" for the sources of
international law against the views of naturalists who felt that the source of in-
ternational law "was essentially the same as the law of nature, applied to the
conduct of nations, in the character of moral persons, susceptible of obligation
and laws."' 8 For himself, Kent adopted a middle position, not unusual among
eighteenth and nineteenth century lawyers, called "mixed" or "Grotian," which
incorporated both positivist and natural elements:
We ought not, therefore, to separate the science of public law
from that of ethics, nor encourage the dangerous suggestion,
that governments are not so strictly bound by the obligations of
truth, justice, and humanity, in relation to other powers, as they
are in the management of their own local concerns. States, or
bodies politic, are to be considered as moral persons, having a
public will, capable and free to do right and wrong, inasmuch as
they are collections of individuals, each of whom carries with
him into the service of the community the same binding law of
morality and religion which ought to control his conduct in pri-
vate life. 19
It was only at this point, after finding worth in both positive and natural
sources of international law, that Kent turned to Christianity and morality:
The law of nations, so far as it is founded on the principles of
natural law, is equally binding in every age, and upon all man-
kind. But the Christian nations of Europe, and their descen-
dants on this side of the Atlantic, by the vast superiority of their
attainments in arts, and science, and commerce, as well as in
policy and government; and, above all, the brighter light, the
15 J. BENTHAM, A Comment on the Commentaries, in A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND
A FRAGMENT ON GovERNMENT 34-37 (Bums & Hart eds., 1977). Bentham had missed the point.
16 MILLER, supra note 4, at 166.
17 KENT, AMERICAN LAW, supra note 7, at 2.
is Id.
19 Id. at 2-3.
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more certain truths, and the more definite sanction, which
Christianity has communicated to the ethical jurisprudence of
the ancients, have established a law of nations peculiar to them-
selves. They form together a community of nations, united by
religion, manners, morals, humanity, and science, and united
also by the mutual advantages of commercial intercourse, by the
habit of forming alliances and treaties with each other, of inter-
changing ambassadors, and of studying and recognizing the
same writers and systems of public law.2°
This Christian "community of nations" was a vital element in Kent's
analysis of international law, a law which he was persuaded was only "the off-
spring of modem times.",2' He argued that only in the eleventh century did five
institutions - "the feudal system, the concurrence of Europe in one form of reli-
gious worship and government, the establishment of chivalry, the negotiations
and treaties forming the conventional law of Europe, and the settlement of a
scale of political rank and precedence - combine to begin to establish the mod-
em law of nations., 22 Christianity was the most important:
Of all these causes of reformation, the most weight is to be at-
tributed to the intimate alliance of the great powers as one
Christian community. The influence of Christianity was very
efficient towards the introduction of a better and more enlight-
ened sense of right and justice among the governments of
Europe. It taught the duty of benevolence to strangers, of hu-
manity to the vanquished, of the obligation of good faith, and of
the sin of murder, revenge, and rapacity. The history of Europe,
during the early periods of modern history, abounds with inter-
esting and strong cases, to show the authority of the church over
turbulent princes and fierce warriors, and the effect of that au-
thority in meliorating manners, checking violence, and intro-
ducing a system of morals which inculcated peace, moderation
and justice.23
Though Kent set the heritage of the discipline back into the medieval
Catholic "confederacy of the Christian nations" which was "bound together by a
sense of common duty and interest in respect to the rest of mankind, 24 he be-
20 Id. at 3-4.
21 Id. at4.
22 id. at 9-10.
23 Id. at 10.
24 Id.
2007]
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lieved that it was not until the seventeenth century and the Protestant jurist
Grotius that international law truly emerged in its modern form:
Thus stood the law of nations at the age of Grotius. It had been
rescued, to a very considerable extent, from the cruel usages
and practices of the northern barbarians. It had been restored to
some degree of science and civility by the influence of Christi-
anity, the study of the Roman law, and the spirit of commerce.
It had grown greatly in value and efficacy, from the intimate
connexion and constant intercourse of the modern nations of
Europe, who were derived from a common origin, and were
governed by similar institutions, manners, laws, and religion.
But it was still in a state of extreme disorder, and its principles
were little known, and less observed. It consisted of a series of
undigested precedents, without order or authority. Grotius has,
therefore, been justly considered as the father of the law of na-
tions; and he arose like a splendid luminary, dispelling darkness
and confusion, and imparting light and security to the inter-
course of nations.25
A "splendid luminary?" What was it in Grotius that triggered such adu-
lation? In Kent's day, Grotius' great treatise of 1625, The Law of War and
Peace, was no longer the standard text on international law. Vattel's The Law
of Nations,26 published in 1758, had already long displaced Grotius in the public
27eye. Grotius, reprinted or translated fifty times between 1625 and 1758, was,
in the hundred years after 1758, reprinted or translated only twice.2
Rather than current notoriety, it seems that what appealed to Kent was
what one might call the "Grotian ethic" or perhaps what one might more pre-
cisely term "Kent's restatement of the Grotian ethic." In his influential Com-
mentaries, Kent summarized Grotius' elaboration of "the reasons which led him
25 Id. at 15.
26 EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS (G.G. & J. Robinson ed.,
1797).
27 Joseph G. Starke, The Influence of Grotius Upon the Development of International Law in
the Eighteenth Century, in 2 GROTIAN SOCIETY PAPERS 1972 -- STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE
LAW OF NATIONS 162-76, (C.H. Alexandrowicz ed., 1972) [hereinafter Starke].
28 Francis Steven Ruddy, The Acceptance of Vattel, in Starke, supra note 27, at 177-79. In his
new and revised edition of Vattel in 1834, Joseph Chitty wrote of Vattel's "pre-eminent impor-
tance" and ventured the speculation "that everyone who has attentively read this work, will admit
that he has acquired a knowledge of superior sentiments, and more important information, than he
ever derived from any other work." Joseph Chitty, Introduction to EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE
LAWS OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND
AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, at iii (Joseph Chitty ed., 1834).
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to undertake his necessary, and most useful, and immortal work. ' 29 Grotius,
unlike Vattel, had set the central problem of international law in a particularly
Christian context. The Grotian ethic was elaborated during the terrible slaughter
of the Thirty Years War:
Fully convinced by the considerations which I have advanced,
that there is a common law among nations, which is valid alike
for war and in war, I have had many and weighty reasons for
undertaking to write upon this subject. Throughout the Chris-
tian world I observed a lack of restraint in relation to war, such
as even barbarous races should be ashamed of; I observed that
men rush to arms for slight causes, or no cause at all, and that
when arms have once been taken up there is no longer any re-
spect for law, divine or human; it is as if, in accordance with a
general decree, frenzy had openly been let loose for the com-
mitting of all crimes.30
As Kent described the Grotian ethic:
The object of Grotius was to [show] a community of sentiment
among the wise and learned of all nations and ages, in favour of
the natural law of morality. He likewise undertook to show that
justice was of perpetual obligation, and essential to the well be-
ing of every society, and that the great commonwealth of na-
tions stood in need of law, and the observance of faith, and the
practice of justice.3'
Grotius was attractive to Kent, not only because Grotius recognized that
there was an inevitable conflict between the awful reality of war and the Chris-
tian ideal of universal love and brotherhood, but because he employed what for
Americans was an enticing mix of hard-headed positivistic realism and a per-
suasive naturalistic moralism to reconcile the conflict. Grotius' reconciliation
was based on the notion of sovereign consent to legally binding rules, either
explicitly in treaties or implicitly in custom. 32 Grotius' construction acknowl-
edged the plain reality of the independence of states (and hence the need for
state consent), but maintained that states were nevertheless legally and morally
obliged by their commitments.
29 KENT, AMERICAN LAW, supra note 7, at 15-16.
30 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELLI Ac PACiS LIBRI TRES 20 (Prolegomena Sections 28, 29), in 2
THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (F. W. Kelsey trans., James B. Scott ed., 1925).
31 Kent, American Law, supra note 7, at 15.
32 MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-6, 9-16, 41-44 (4th ed. 2003)
[hereinafter Janis, International Law].
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As an American, Kent was employing Christianity generally and the
Grotian ethic particularly to grapple with one of international law's most trou-
blesome open questions, its international efficacy. This was a question not both-
ering Blackstone, who looked more or less exclusively at the incorporation of
the law of nations in the municipal law of England. Kent's description of a
Christian community of nations helped him explain why international law actu-
ally worked in international practice. It was one thing for an American judge to
apply the rules of common law i la Blackstone in a domestic court case. It was
quite another for international law to be applied in the conduct of international
relations. Domestically, the law courts could count upon the ordinary powers of
the state to enforce their judgments. Internationally, Kent knew that no execu-
tive branch existed to sanction violators of international law. Kent's Christian-
ity was ethically imperative and practically useful.
Like Grotius before him, Kent set the positive substantive rules of inter-
national law on a moral procedural foundation. Doing so included an affirma-
tion that the ethics of a Christian community of nations helped enforce the law
of nations. Kent believed that the new United States, as part of the Christian
community of nations, ought therefore to live up to its moral obligation to re-
spect the international law of that community. It was, I think, just this percep-
tion of the ethical efficacy of international law in international relations that led
the German scholar, Hans-Ulrich Scupin, to conclude that Kent, an American,
was probably the "earliest writer to display the modern approach" to interna-
tional law.
33
III. DAVID Low DODGE, NOAH WORCESTER, WILLIAM LADD, AND THE IDEAL
OF AN INTERNATIONAL COURT
Just as committed as James Kent to an ethical international law, but for
another cause, was an influential band of early 19th century American advocates
of an international court. Nowadays international courts are so much the erudite
province of lawyers and judges that it is easy to suppose that it was they who
were principally responsible for their creation. However, to a surprising extent,
the international courts of today are a product of the work of 19th century
Americans by and large untrained in the law: David Low Dodge, Noah Worces-
ter, and William Ladd.
These ethical proponents of international courts were initially active be-
tween the War of 1812 and the American Civil War. This half century was the
period when the particulars of modem international institutions took on concrete
form and when the ethical agitation for such a court became quite strong in
America. The ideas and enthusiasm then generated for an international court
33 Hans-Ulrich Scupin, History of the Law of Nations 1815 to World War I, in 7 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 179, 196 (1984).
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were thus already in place when, between 1865 and 1945, the ideal of an inter-
national court captured the imagination of those Americans who promoted and
helped institute the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1899, the Permanent
Court of Justice in 1920, and the International Court of Justice in 1945.
Some of the earliest texts of the nineteenth century American peace
movement were penned by David Low Dodge (1774-1852), a Connecticut Pres-
byterian become New York merchant whose self study led him to pacifism in
1808. In 1809, Dodge wrote a much-heralded condemnation of war, The Me-
diator's Kingdom not of this World but Spiritual, Heavenly, and Divine. Dodge
marshaled economic, political, and humanitarian rationales alongside religious
objections to prove that war was wrong and unlawful. 34
Dodge was a New Englander. This was no coincidence. The 19th cen-
tury pacifist movement was always stronger in New England than elsewhere in
the United States.35 The pacifism of many New Englanders, especially the con-
servative Federalists, was reinforced by the War of 1812. The interruption of
New England's European commerce and the British attacks on the New England
coast led many New Englanders to condemn all wars or at least all aggressive
wars.
At the abortive, possibly secessionist, Hartford Convention (December
1814 - January 1815), delegates from Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Is-
land, New Hampshire, and Vermont boldly resolved that "[r]arely can the state
of this country call for or justify offensive war." They demanded a constitu-
tional amendment requiring that "Congress shall not make or declare war, or
authorize acts of hostility against any foreign nation, without the concurrence of
two thirds of both houses, except such acts of hostility be in defence of the terri-
tories of the United States when actually invaded. 36
More extreme still was the rhetoric from some New England pulpits.
The Rev. Elijah Parish of Byfield, Massachusetts, urged his congregation to
proclaim an honourable neutrality; let the southern Heroes fight
their own battles and guard .. .against the just vengeance of
their lacerated slaves . . . Break those chains, under which you
have sullenly murmured, during the long, long reign of democ-
racy; . . . and once more breath that free commercial air of
New England which your fathers always enjoyed .. .Protest
did I say, protest? Forbid this war to proceed in New Eng-
land.37
34 PETER BROCK, PACIFISM IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE FIRST
WORLD WAR 450-66 (1968).
35 Id. at 469.
36 THEODORE DWIGHT, HISTORY OF THE HARTFORD CONVENTION: WITH A REVIEW OF THE
POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, WHICH LED TO THE WAR OF 1812 351-52, 373, 378
(1833).
37 See JAMES M. BANNER, JR., To THE HARTFORD CONVENTION 307 (1970).
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It should not be surprising, then, that Dodge's most influential book was
published in 1814 in the heat of the War of 1812. His War Inconsistent with the
Religion of Jesus Christ showed seven reasons why war was inhuman, eight
why it was unwise, and eleven why it was criminal. Dodge concluded with this
call to action:
All who earnestly desire and look for the millennial glory of the
church should consider that it can never arrive until the spirit
and practice of war are abolished. All who love our Lord Jesus
Christ in sincerity cannot but ardently desire that wars may
cease to the ends of the earth and that mankind should embrace
each other as brethren. If so, is it not their duty to do all in their
power to promote so benevolent an object? Ought not every in-
dividual Christian to conduct in such a manner that if every
other person imitated his example it would be best for the
whole? If so, would they not immediately renounce everything
that leads to wars and fighting and embrace everything which
would promote that glorious reign of righteousness and peace
for which they earnestly hope, long, and pray? "The work of
righteousness shall be peace, and the effect righteousness, qui-
etness and assurance forever.
' 38
Alongside Dodge's evangelistic pacifist works came the efforts of Noah
Worcester (1758-1837), a New Hampshire-born Unitarian minister in Massa-
chusetts. Worcester, a veteran of the American Revolutionary War, came only
gradually to his anti-war position. It was the War of 1812, Worcester wrote,
which was "the occasion of perfecting the revolution in my mind in regard to
the lawfulness of war.' 39 In 1814, the same year of Dodge's key essay, Worces-
ter published A Solemn Review of the Custom of War, which was to become a
classic, probably "the most widely distributed of all Peace literature."
40
Worcester later explained that:
I became thoroughly convinced that war is the effect of delu-
sion, totally repugnant to the Christian religion, and wholly un-
necessary except as it becomes necessary from delusion and the
basest passions of human nature; that when it is waged for a re-
dress of wrongs, its tendency is to multiply wrongs a hundred-
38 DAVID Low DODGE, WAR INCONSISTENT WITH THE RELIGION OF JESUS CHRIST 120 (Ginn &
Co. ed., 1905).
39 H. WARE, MEMOIRS OF THE REV. NOAH WORCESTER, D.D. 64 (1844) [hereinafter WARE,
NOAH WORCESTER].
40 A.C.F. BEALEs, THE HISTORY OF PEACE: A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE ORGANIZED
MOVEMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 45 (1931).
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fold; and that in principle, the best we can make of it, is doing
evil that good may come.41
Worcester rejected the notion that God means man to fight and that war
is a good way of sending off bad men.42 In dealing with the contention "that no
substitute for war can be devised, which will insure to a nation a redress of
wrongs, 43 he introduced the idea of an international court, albeit without the
detail that would follow in the writings of others:
But if the eyes of people could be opened in regard to the evils
and delusions of war, would it not be easy to form a confeder-
acy of nations, and organize a high court of equity, to decide na-
tional controversies? Why might not such a court be composed
of some of the most eminent characters from each nation; and a
compliance with the decisions of the court be made a point of
national honor, to prevent the effusion of blood, and to preserve
the blessings of peace? Can any considerate person say, that the
probability of obtaining right in such a court, would be less than
by an appeal to arms?44
Worcester went on to applaud the peaceful tradition of the Quakers and
Shakers,45 to attack the depravity occasioned by war upon armies and general
populations,46 and to show how war was contrary to the spirit and teachings of
Christianity.47 He envisioned peace societies spreading to every Christian na-
tion and serving as vehicles for educating public opinion about the horrors of
war.48 "[L]et lawyers, politicians and divines, and men of every class, who can
write or speak, consecrate their talents to the diffusion of light, love and
peace.'49
When the War of 1812 came to a close in the early months of 1815, the
New England Federalists, now seen as unpatriotic, watched their party slide into
political oblivion. But the anti-war sentiment of Dodge and Worcester per-
sisted. So did the idea of peace societies. No sooner was the war against Eng-
land over in 1815 that Dodge in New York, Worcester in Massachusetts, and
41 WARE, NOAH WORCESTER, supra note 39, at 66-67.
42 NOAH WORCESTER, A SOLEMN REVIEW OF THE CUSTOM OF WAR, SHOWING THAT WAR IS THE
EFFECT OF POPULAR DELUSION AND PROPOSING A REMEDY 5-6 (11 th ed. 1833).
43 Id. at 6.
44 Id. at 7.
45 Id. at 7-8.
46 Id. at 9-10.
47 Id. at 10-17.
48 Id. at 17-24.
49 Id. at 21.
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two Quakers in Ohio independently founded the world's first peace societies.5 °
More state peace societies followed in New England in Maine, New Hampshire,
Vermont, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, and, further afield, in Pennsylvania,
North Carolina, and Georgia.5'
These post-War of 1812 peace societies were largely middle class.
Dodge's New York Peace Society was "eminently respectable, decidedly bour-
geois, with its Wall Street brokers, merchants and businessmen, clergymen and
philanthropic gentlemen active 'in the most benevolent enterprises of the
day.' 52 Worcester's Massachusetts Peace Society was in its membership even
"more august" than New York for it included, in addition to an imposing array
of ministers of religion, and substantial Boston merchants, "the names of the
governor, the lieutenant governor, two respectable judges, the president and
several professors of Harvard University. 53
In terms of doctrine, the New York society was more absolutist, pro-
moting a thorough-going sort of Christian non-resistant pacifism. Massachu-
setts, however, influenced by Worcester's gradualism, was more forgiving of the
use of force. The Massachusetts Peace Society sought to influence public and
governmental opinion by preaching against the immorality, waste, and irrelig-
iousity of war. More than New York, Massachusetts was interested in political
alternatives to war. Worcester especially was keen to show that international
law and arbitration could serve as a reasonable realistic substitute for war as a
means of international dispute settlement.
54
As the peace societies spread throughout the United States in the 1820's
and 1830's, it was the Massachusetts gradualist model that proved the more
influential. Membership ranged from radical pacifists to conservative peace
enthusiasts. Worcester, who founded and until 1828 edited the popular Friend
of Peace, rather than Dodge, became the more important figure.55 Devout and
usually prosperous churchmen from the Unitarians, Presbyterians, Congrega-
tionalists, Baptists, and Methodists filled peace society ranks. Episcopalians,
Roman Catholics and, curiously, Quakers were not so active. The reluctance of
Friends to join may well have been due to their disappointment that Worcester's
groups refused to condemn all wars.56
Already, the peace societies were ideologically split. One of the fun-
damentally divisive issues was whether there was any obligation to promote
50 BROCK, supra note 34, at 458-59, 472; BEALES, supra note 40, at 45-46. A year later a Brit-
ish peace society was founded by Quakers in London. Id. at 46.
51 James Brown Scott, Introduction to WILLIAM LADD, AN ESSAY ON A CONGRESS OF NATIONS
FOR THE ADJUSTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPuTES WrrHOUT RESORT TO ARMS, at vii (Carnegie
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1916) (1840) [hereinafter Scott].
52 BROCK, supra note 34, at 460.
53 Id. at 472.
54 Id. at 471-73, 459-68.
55 Id. at 474; BEALES, supra note 40, at 51-52.
56 BROCK, supra note 34, at 478-79.
[Vol. 109
THE QUEST FOR AN ETHICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
alternatives to war. For most of the Dodge-like and Quaker pacifists, a total
renunciation of war was intrinsic to the movement. For Worcester and the
gradualists, if the movement were to succeed, there needed to be substitutes to
war, substitutes that might sometimes require forceful sanctions. Worcester
had already hinted at the potential for international arbitration. As the peace
societies matured, Worcester's hint was heard, at least in America,58 and more
elaborate schemes for international adjudication followed.
Probably, the key American figure in the early elaboration of the ideal
of an international court was William Ladd (1778-1841). Born in Exeter, New
Hampshire, and graduated in 1797 from Harvard College, Ladd first followed
the sea and then settled down in Maine on his family's prosperous farm. His
conversion to the peace movement came in 1819, in part due to a reading of
Worcester.59
Ladd made two important contributions to the American international
court movement. First, in 1828, he consolidated the state peace societies into a
national federation, the American Peace Society, of which he served first as
executive officer and then its president. Until his death in 1841, Ladd was the
leading light of the peace societies, British as well as American. 60 He was in-
strumental in the publication of the Society's monthly journal, first called the
Harbinger of Peace in 1828, and later the Calumet in 1831, the American Advo-
cate of Peace in 1835, and the Advocate of Peace, when in 1837, the American
Peace Society moved from Hartford to Boston.61
Second, in 1840, Ladd published his Essay on a Congress of Nations.
To some extent at least, Ladd's Essay was a consolidation of the efforts of oth-
ers. Under his direction, the American Peace Society had organized an essay
competition on the theme "A Congress of Nations." About forty essays vied for
-a "reward offered by two gentlemen of New York." Two award committees
illustriously composed of United States Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story,
Attorney-General William Wirt, South Carolina Senator John C. Calhoun, for-
mer President John Quincy Adams, our old friend, New York Chancellor James
Kent, and Massachusetts Senator Daniel Webster were unable to decide which
should win. It was finally decided to publish the five best essays with Ladd
adding "a sixth, taking all the matter from the rejected Essays worth preserv-
57 Id. at 480-81.
58 The emphasis on international organization was not at all so pronounced in England.
BEALES, supra note 40, at 53-54.
59 SCOTr, supra note 51, at iii, v.
60 BEALES, supra note 40, at 52-53.
61 ScoTT, supra note 51, at vii-viii. The name changes continued in the twentieth century; the
journal became THE ADVOCATE OF PEACE THROUGH JUSTICE IN 1920 AND WORLD AFFAIRS IN 1932.
WORLD AFFAIRS, 95 WORLD AFFAIRS 3 (1932).
20071
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
ing," including "such reflections, additions and historical facts as occurred to me
during my labor."
62
Ladd claimed "originality" on "the thought of separating the subject
into two distinct parts:"
1st. A congress of ambassadors from all those Christian and
civilized nations who should choose to send them, for the pur-
pose of settling the principles of international law by compact
and agreement, of the nature of a mutual treaty, and also by de-
vising and promoting plans for the preservation of peace, and
meliorating the condition of man. 2d. A court of nations, com-
posed of the most able civilians in the world, to arbitrate or
judge such cases as should be brought before it, by the mutual
consent of two or more contending nations: thus dividing en-
tirely the diplomatic from the judicial functions, which require
such different, not to say opposite, characters in the exercise of
their functions. I consider the Congress as the legislature, and
the Court as the judiciary, in the government of nations, leaving
the functions of the executive with public opinion, "the queen
of the world." This division I have never seen in any essay or
plan for a congress or diet of independent nations, either ancient
or modern; and I believe it will obviate all the objections which
have been heretofore made to such a plan. 3
Ladd's proposal that international organization be divided into legisla-
tive, judicial, and executive branches was, of course, a logical step to be taken
by an American familiar with the comparable provision for separation of powers.
in the United States Constitution. Such an analysis was also a reflection of the
wide-spread emergence in nineteenth century Europe and America of both
treaty-making conferences and ad hoc courts of arbitration. The progressive
development of international arbitration, a genuinely encouraging course of
international practice, had begun in 1794 with the Jay Treaty, an agreement
concluded by the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom as
a means for resolving the many disputes still remaining after Britain's formal
acknowledgment of American independence in 1783. 64
62 WILLIAM LADD, AN ESSAY ON A CONGRESS OF NATIONS FOR THE ADJUSTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES WITHOUT RESORT TO ARMS, at xlix (Carnegie ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1916) (1840) [hereinafter LADD]. There had been similar essay competitions organized by peace
societies in France (1824), Switzerland (1830 and 1834), and England (1838), but none generated
specific plans like the American. BEALES, supra note 40, at 61-62.
63 LADD, supra note 62, at xlix-l.
64 A.D. McNAmR, LORD McNAIR: SELECTED PAPERS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 198 (1974); Hans-
Jiirgen Schlochauer, Arbitration in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 13, 14
(Bernhardt, 1981).
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The Jay Treaty generated a surprising number of arbitral awards: some
536 between 1799 and 1804.65 John Bassett Moore, more than a century later,
identified the Jay Treaty as the turning-point in international arbitration's for-
tunes, noting that though the judicial settlement of international disputes was an
ancient device, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with their religious,
"dynastic, territorial and commercial contests" provided "little opportunity for
arbitration. 66 The first of the Jay Treaty arbitrations, the St. Croix River Arbi-
tration, marked in his opinion, "the revival in modern times of the practice of
international arbitration, which religious, colonial, and commercial struggles
had so long held in suspense.,
67
Despite the progress of the times, Ladd still deserves to be reckoned a
visionary. His proposed international court went much further than international
arbitration had gone before. Ladd recognized that no one kind of government
was best for all nations - "the different features of all these forms of govern-
ment are variously combined in infinite diversity, according to the genius of the
people governed ' 68 - but he gave a form of government that promoted an in-
dependent judiciary a special paean and suggested such a court for the commu-
nity of nations. This certainly had an American flavor:
In many governments, the legislative has been entirely sepa-
rated from the judicial power, and the executive from both. In
all of them, the impartiality of the judicial power has been in a
ratio equal to the knowledge and virtue of the people. In some
of these governments, laws have been made, not only for secur-
ing the rights of private individuals, but also of bodies corpo-
rate, and even of component parts of the empire which are for
many purposes independent. No such thing has yet been done
with respect to nations, though courts have been instituted, to
decide controversies which have arisen between two or more
members of the same confederacy of nations. Our object is to
go one step further, and appoint a court, by which contests be-
tween nations shall be settled, without resort to arms, when any
65 ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 128-129 (rev. ed. 1954)
[hereinafter NuSSBAUM].
66 John Bassett Moore, General Introduction to I INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS: ANCIENT
AND MODERN, at vii, x (J.B. Moore ed., Modem Series, 1929) [hereinafter cited as Moore]. There
were thousands of recorded international arbitrations in the Middle Ages. For the multitude touch-
ing on the Netherlands alone, see J.H.W. VERZIJL, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 400-434 (1968). Verzijl was "driven to despair" by their number. Id. at 407.
67 John Bassett Moore, Preface to Saint Croix River Arbitration in Moore, supra note 66, at
Xcv.
68 LADD, supra note 62, at 3.
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such controversy shall be brought, by mutual consent, before
it.
69
Ladd considered it a given that "the same moral laws which ought to
govern individuals, ought to govern nations., 70 When wrongs were done to
nations, war ought to be avoided either (1) "by cultivating a spirit of peace,
which is the spirit of the gospel" and overlooking the injury or appealing "to the
moral sense" of the injuring nation; (2) by negotiation and compromise; or (3)
by mediation or arbitration and acceptance of the award. 7 Even better would be
a court:
As government is an ordinance of God, necessary for the safety,
happiness and improvement of the human race, and as it is ab-
solutely necessary for the peace of society, that when the selfish
passions of man come in conflict, the judgment of the case
should not be left with the individuals concerned, but with some
impartial tribunal; so it is equally necessary, for the peace and
happiness of mankind, that when the selfish passions of nations
come into conflict, the decision of the case should not be left
with an individual nation concerned, but should be referred to
some great tribunal, that should give a verdict on the affairs of
nations, in the same manner that a civil court decides the dis-
putes of individuals.72
Ladd recognized two difficulties: the "first of these is the want of a
body of men to enact and promulgate laws for the government of nations; the
other is the want of a physical force to carry the decisions of a court of nations
into execution. 73 The legislative problem Ladd solved with his Congress of
Nations.74 The second he granted was more troublesome, but the trouble was
much less "if we look into the condition of man in a state of civilization,
[where] it will be found, that where one man obeys the laws for fear of the
sword of the magistrate, an hundred obey them through fear of public opin-
ion. ,75 So, for a Court of Nations,
"[though at the commencement of this system, its success may
not be so great as is desirable, yet, as moral power is every day
69 Id. at 3-4.
70 Id. at4.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 5.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 5-6.
75 Id. at 6.
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increasing in a geometrical ratio, it will finally take the place of
all wars between civilized and Christian nations, much in the
same manner as a civil court has taken the place of the judicial
combat.,
76
Ladd's Essay was not only an ethical aspiration. It had practical value.
In 1872, Elihu Burritt, characterized Ladd as "the Apostle of Peace," and termed
his Essay's High Court of Nations "the noblest and loftiest bar that could be
established on earth.",77 In 1916, James Brown Scott called Ladd's Essay his
"abiding title to fame., 78 In 1935, in a dispassionate and "scientific" study,
Georg Schwarzenberger decided that there was "a direct line" in the history of
ideas about international organization "from Ladd to the achievements of Ge-
neva [the Alabama arbitration explored below], and even further, on the founda-
tions of his Equity Tribunal, to a real League of Nations., 79 Ladd and his prede-
cessors had, like Kent before them, made an ethical contribution to the devel-
opment of international law.
IV. ELIHU BURRITT AND THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE
MOVEMENT
By the 1840's, the American movement for the peaceful reign of inter-
national law had already stepped from the individual speculations of Dodge and
Worcester, to the peace societies in New York, Massachusetts, and other states,
and even further to William Ladd, the projects in his Essay, and the nation-wide
American Peace Society. The logical next step for the American movement was
agitation and organization for an international crusade for peace and justice.
The person, more than any other, who took that next step was "the learned
blacksmith," Elihu Burritt (1810-1879). Burritt came to be known as the "sym-
bol of the international peace movement of the mid-nineteenth century," yet
another American ethical contribution to the real world of international law.8°
Before he became an advocate for world peace, Burritt was already
celebrated in America and England as a gifted linguist who spoke fifty lan-
guages.81 His linguistic achievements were all the more remarkable because
Burritt had been born poor, the third of ten children of a New Britain, Connecti-
76 Id. at7.
77 Scott, supra note 51, at iii.
78 Id. at viii.
79 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER & WILLIAM LADD: AN EXAMINATION OF AN AMERICAN
PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL EQUITY TRIBUNAL 7, 37 (1935).
80 P. TOLlS, ELIHu BuRRrrT: CRUSADER FOR BROTHERHOOD 1 (1968).
81 THE INQUIRER (London), No. 41 at 227-228 (April 15, 1843). The figure may have been
inflated. Tolis, one of Burritt's biographers, opines that "the number of languages he could read
(he spoke more of them) was closer to thirty than fifty," though admitting that even this was "no
mean accomplishment." TOLLS, supra note 80, at 16-17.
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cut family who could provide their son with little formal schooling. Appren-
ticed at sixteen to a blacksmith, Burritt began to study Latin and Greek in his
spare time. By his early twenties he had broadened his interests to French, Span-
ish, Italian, German, and Hebrew. In 1837, at age twenty-seven, Burritt set off
on foot to Boston hoping to sailor his way to distant parts to acquire more lan-
guages. On the way he stopped in Worcester, Massachusetts, where he found
that the American Antiquarian Society Library there would lend him foreign
grammars. He stayed in Worcester, working as a blacksmith, adding to his
tongues and beginning to work as a translator.
It was in Worcester in 1840, the same year as Ladd's Essay, that Burritt
was discovered by Massachusetts Governor Edward Everett who publicized
Burritt's achievements and introduced him to Longfellow. Longfellow sug-
gested that Burritt work at Harvard, but Burritt chose instead to take to the prof-
itable lecture circuit, where he extolled in a very personal way self-culture and
the self-made-man, topics already made popular by William Ellery Channing.
82
Burritt, it seems, came to the idea of world peace by his own contempla-
tions. Up until 1843, while still in Worcester, Burritt was more or less unaware
of the active peace movement in nearby Hartford or Boston. Only in preparing
a lecture on the earth's anatomy did he become persuaded that the interdepen-
dency of the different parts of the globe made a strong argument against war.
He lectured on this topic at the Tremont Theater in Boston and, speaking to an
audience that included some peace advocates, was recruited to the cause of
peace. Back in Worcester, Burritt inaugurated a weekly newspaper, the Chris-
tian Citizen and, later in Worcester and then in England alongside the Quaker,
Edmund Fry, established a paper, The Bond of Universal Brotherhood.83
Burritt threw his enthusiasm and considerable organizational talent into
a peace movement already taking on an international, or at least Anglo-
American, character. In 1841, the Boston Convention of the Friends of Peace
had resolved to call an international peace conference. That meeting, the First
Universal Peace Convention, was held in June 1843. The venue was London
where it was hoped delegates could attend from all over. However, though there
were 292 delegates from the United Kingdom and 26 from the United States,
only six from all the nations of the Continent.84 This was all too typical. De-
spite missionary work on the Continent, the American and London Peace Socie-
ties were unable to foster any European peace societies before the 1860's except
for ones in France and Switzerland.85
The Anglo-American nature of the 19th century peace movement may
explain why a European, the Dutch scholar, P.H. Kooijmans, perhaps looking
82 MERLE CURTI, THE LEARNED BLACKSMITH: THE LETrERS AND JOURNALS OF ELIHu BuRRn-r
1-7 (1937).; ToLLs, supra note 80, at 3-27; Camp, World's First Champion of Peace, 10 CONN.
MAG. 499-602 (No. 4, 1906).
83 CURTI, supra note 82, at 20-21 & 28; Camp, supra note 82, at 602-603.
84 BEALES, supra note 40, at 66-67.
85 Id. at 50, 54-55.
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too narrowly at continental Protestantism, insisted that Protestantism after the
time of Grotius had made little impact on the development of international law:
[I]n the centuries following the Reformation Protestantism be-
came rather inward looking, emphasizing theological issues and
seemingly forgetful to the fact that the Gospel, according to the
teachings of the early Reformers, had its impact on all spheres
of life, including that of the relations between states. And this
element also contributed to the fact that Protestant churches sel-
dom raised their voice against the policy of their national gov-
ernment, however illegal or improper or plainly wicked this pol-
icy may have been. And in this sense it must be said that Protes-
tantism as such has made hardly any contribution to the rule of
law in this world in past centuries, although many Protestants
have struggled heroically against evil forces.86
A similar continental expression was expressed by our favorite antago-
nist, Martti Koskenniemi, who dismissed the "peace societies and federalist- and
pacificist movements with their strongest base within the Anglo-American
world" as "incompatible with an attempt to conceptualize the post-Napoleonic
system in terms of legal rules. ,87 This seems so wide of the mark that one
suspects that continental civil lawyers, then as now, have trouble with common
law moralizing. Kooijmans and Koskenniemi seem to take comfort in drawing
a black line between the "science" of law and the "emotions" of morality and
religion, a line often and cheerfully crossed by Americans.
Whatever the cause, the First Universal Peace Conference of 1843 was,
indeed, really more "Anglo-American" than truly "Universal." Despite, or be-
cause of, its heavily British contingent, the Conference took a strong stand
against British imperialism, unanimously resolving, e.g.:
[t]hat the recent wars in China, Afghanistan, and now on the
Ameers of Scinde, are, in the opinion of this Convention, gross
violations of all equitable Christian principles, and directly cal-
culated to prejudice the reception of evangelical truth in heathen
nations, as well as to depreciate the character and influence of
the British people throughout the whole civilized world.88
In May 1846, Burritt left America for England. Expecting to stay in
Britain for four months, Burritt remained for four years. Early on, in July 1846,
86 P.H. Kooijrnans, Protestantism and the Development of International Law, 152 HAGUE
RECUEIL 79, 109 (1976).
87 MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, 35 (2002).
88 THE INQUIRER (London), No. 51, at 395-396 (Jun. 24, 1843).
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he founded The League of Universal Brotherhood. Key to Burritt's League, and
one of the earliest distinctively American commitments to an international law
of human rights, was a pledge by each member to a "bond" promising to elevate
"man, as a being, as a brother, irrespective of his country, color, character, or
condition" and never to enlist in the armed forces or support any war. By the
end of Burritt's stay in England in 1850, the League had come to number about
25,000 Americans and a like number of Britons, but, despite much effort, only a
few Germans and Dutch.89
Burritt's most remarkable contributions were made as a propagandist
able to reach a broad public with his ideas about peace and justice.90 His imme-
diate objective in the late 1840's was to damp the sparks of international conflict
that could inflame countries to war. In speeches, pamphlets, and newspapers
Burritt argued not only against war between England and America over Oregon,
but also against the Mexican-American War and the possibility of war between
England and France. 91
Burritt went to Paris in August 1848 to organize a new peace confer-
ence, but the July revolution made the city an unhappy venue.92 Burritt was
much discouraged by the evidences of Revolution all around him:
The quais on both sides of the Seine from the Tuileries as far as
the eye could search were crowded by the National Guards,
nearly 100,000 of whom were out, marching through the city,
singing the Marseillaise and crying "A bas la Communistes!
Vive La Republique," & c. This demonstration was called out
to oppose one of the multitude directed against the government.
It appears that the Communists are inciting the people on to
demand and procure a division of property, or a general confis-
cation in favour of the multitude; and that this military manifes-
tation was to overawe them. Never did I witness such a scene.
The Marseillaise was sung by thousands of the National Guard
as they marched with their glittering bayonets through the city.
It was the last sound I heard when I had retired to rest.93
Unable to hold the Peace Conference in Paris, Burritt turned instead to Brussels
where his Popular International Peace Congress opened on September 20, 1848.
Burritt addressed the meeting on the need for a Congress and a Court of Na-
tions, a project that he acknowledged he had inherited from William Ladd.94
89 CURTI, supra note 82, at 29-32; Camp, supra note 82, at 603; BEALES, supra note 40, at 73.
90 TOLIS, supra note 80, at 132.
91 CURTI, supra note 82, at 28-32.
92 BEALES, supra note 40, at 76; CURTI, supra note 82, at 38.
93 CURTI, supra note 82, at 51-52 (entry of April 16, 1848).
94 Camp, supra note 82, at 603; CURTI, supra note 82, at 37-39.
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Paris made up for 1848 by hosting in 1849 what may have been "the most stu-
pendous of the whole series" of international peace conferences.95 Victor Hugo
delivered the inaugural address:
A day will come when the only battlefield will be the market
opened to commerce, and the mind opening to new ideas. A
day will come when bullets and bombshells will be replaced by
votes, by the universal suffrage of nations, by the venerable ar-
bitration of a great sovereign senate, which will be to Europe
what the Parliament is to England, what the Diet is to Germany,
what the Legislative Assembly is to France!
96
The 1849 Paris Conference welcomed more than 600 delegates, this
time many from outside England and America. It marked the moment when the
peace movement moved from its Anglo-American religious foundations to take
on an international character.97 Third and Fourth Peace Conferences followed in
Frankfurt in 1850 and in London in 1851. Burritt organized mass meetings in
England and the Continent and did what he could to moderate the difficulties
involving Austria and Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein and the great powers
in the Crimea.
98
Burritt lobbied tirelessly and at remarkably high levels for his peace
proposals. In 1849, he urged on Alexis de Tocqueville, then the French Foreign
Minister, the cause of peace. The famous author of Democracy in America re-
sponded favorably, but "although personally his sympathies were with all efforts
to accomplish such a desirable end he feared that its attainment was far dis-
tant." 99
Much less satisfying were Burritt's meetings with the Germans. About
one interviewee, he concluded:
He seemed like most of the Germans that we have met, to have
no faith in anything except brute force. The government had a
mighty army at their command, and the people could do nothing
until they could overpower that force. This seemed to be his
idea. We tried to argue with him, showing the impotence of
brute force either for the people or for Governments.
1°°
95 BEALES, supra note 40, at 78.
96 Id. at 78-79.
97 Id.
98 CURTI, supra note 82, at 39-41.
99 Id. at 59-61 (entry of July 15, 1849).
100 Id. at 62 (entry of July 19, 1850).
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In 1854, Burritt even had an audience at the White House with Franklin
Pierce. The American President and Burritt, it seemed, were of quite the same
persuasion:
[The President] sat down by me, and commenced a lively con-
versation; first inquiring if I still pursued the study of languages
and then entering upon the subject of peace. I was almost sur-
prised at the force and emphasis of his declarations in reference
to this question. He said no one could more fully appreciate the
miseries of war than he who had witnessed them with his own
eyes and taken part in its scenes. He felt for himself an intense
abhorrence of the system not, only for its horrors but for its
folly. It could not settle any question of controversy. The con-
tending powers must come to negotiation or arbitration at last,
after all their fighting. Why should they not then resort to this
method of adjudication before resorting to arms.'10
However, even as Pierce and Burritt spoke, this phase of the American
movement for international courts was coming to an end. Complicating the
cause of Burritt and the other peace advocates was the problem of slavery and
the political battles about it that would lead to the Civil War.10 2 It was, if you
will, the tragic flaw of the early American peace movement that the crusader for
world peace was often also the same person as the crusader for the abolition of
slavery. Ultimately, the struggle to abolish slavery in America meant war be-
tween the States.
If slavery were unjust and wrong, what should the Christian interna-
tional law advocate do about it? Were there times when violence, even war,
might be justified to eradicate a great evil? As the Civil War approached, Bur-
ritt and the other Christian peace reformers lost support throughout the North as
the use of force to eradicate slavery began to be seen as a necessary evil . In
1856, William Lloyd Garrison concluded, "[p]eace or war is a secondary con-
sideration .... Slavery must be conquered - peaceably if we can, forcibly if we
must.
,
'
0 3
When the Civil War engulfed the nation in April 1861, Burritt and the
other American peace advocates found themselves isolated from the very public
opinion in which they so believed. '04 In January 1862, Burritt wrote to his Eng-
lish friend, Edmund Fry, and complained that "war-fever" in America had cut
off his revenues from peace lecturing. Burritt was despondent and even a bit
fearful:
101 Id. at 82-83 (entry of March 24, 1854).
102 Another affliction, the Crimean War, beset the English peace movement. BEALES, supra
note 40, at 96-104.
103 BEALES, supra note 40, at 105-106.
104 Id. at 104-110; BROCK, supra note 34, at 689-712.
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I am shut up at home [in New Britain, Connecticut] at present
and shall probably take my stand at the anvil again in the after-
noon of each day, writing in the mornings... I have been writ-
ing a long lecture on a Plan of Adjustment and Reunion. .. I
am doubtful whether I can get a hearing for it, and whether it
will not expose me to arrest if I do deliver it anywhere... [O]ur
Government regards it almost open treason to speak of separa-
tion or disunion. 105
After the Civil War, however, American peace advocacy returned
stronger than ever. Many Americans thought that war's days might well be
numbered. The great codifier, David Dudley Field, remarked at the 1876 Cen-
tennial Celebration in Philadelphia:
The history of international law since July 4, 1776, shows that,
notwithstanding the prevalence of almost universal war during
the last quarter of the past century and the first fifteen years of
the present, there has been a general tendency of the nations to
approach each other more closely, to avoid war as much as pos-
sible, and to diminish its severity, when it occurs.1°6
Similarly, in 1910, John W. Foster, Benjamin Harrison's Secretary of
State and grandfather of Dwight Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster
Dulles, opined that all three of America's 19t" century foreign wars - the War of
1812, the 1846 Mexican War, and the 1898 Spanish-American War - could
have been avoided if the disputes precipitating them had "been submitted to
arbitration and decided without recourse to war."'10 7
Foster's admonition seemed not to be mere pipe-dreaming. Interna-
tional arbitration had had a remarkable 19th century American story. Beginning
with the 536 awards of the Jay Treaty arbitrations between 1799 and 1804, men-
tioned above, 108 there had been hundreds of international arbitrations, many
involving the United States.' °9 America was a party to the establishment of in-
ternational arbitral tribunals along the lines of those introduced in the Jay Treaty
105 Letter from Elihu Burritt to Edmund Fry (Jan. 22, 1862) (on file with author).
106 David Dudley Field, American Contributions to International Law, 14 ALBANY L.J. 257,
258 (1876).
107 Foster, Were the Questions Involved in the Foreign Wars of the United States of Such a
Nature that They Could Have Been Submitted to Arbitration of Settled Without Recourse to War?,
PROCEEDINGS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR
JUDICIAL SETrLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: DECEMBER 15-17, 1910 44-68 (1912).
108 NUSSBAUM, supra note 65, at 128-129.
109 A.M. STuYT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS: 1794-1970 1-326 (1972) (re-
cording 317 arbitrations from the Jay Treaty to the outbreak of World War I); RAYMOND LESLIE
BUELL, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 606-607 (2d rev. ed., H. Holt ed.) (1929).
20071
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
with Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Spain, and Venezuela. The busiest of these, the
United States - Mexican Mixed Claims Commission of 1868, heard more than
2,000 claims between 1871 and 1876.10 As Foster noted in a little book in
1904, "[t]he nineteenth century was more fruitful than any similar era in the
submission to the adjudication of special arbitration tribunals of the differences
of nations insolvable by diplomatic methods.l"'
Most important of all was the judgment of the Alabama arbitral tribunal,
probably the most influential event of 19th century American international law.
Delivered in 1872, the Alabama judgment was the work of an ad hoc tribunal
composed of five judges named by each of the United States, Great Britain, It-
aly, Switzerland, and Brazil. It had been empowered by Great Britain and the
United States to decide whether Britain had violated international law when it
permitted British companies to build warships for the Confederacy during the
American Civil War.
The Alabama tribunal ruled that Britain had owed the United States a
duty of "active due diligence" to prevent private parties from supplying the
southern rebels but had failed to observe her international obligations as a neu-
tral state." 12 In relevant part, the judgment read:
And whereas, with respect to the vessel called the Alabama, it
clearly results from all the facts relative to the construction of
the ship, at first designated by the number '290,' in the port of
Liverpool, and its equipment and armament in the vicinity of
Terceira, through the agency of the vessels called the Agrippina
and the Bahama, dispatched from Great Britain to that end, that
the British Government failed to use due diligence in the per-
formance of its neutral obligations, and especially that it omit-
ted, notwithstanding the warnings and official representations
made by the diplomatic agents of the United States during the
construction of the said number '290,' to take in due time any
effective measures of prevention, and that those orders which it
did give at last, for the detention of the vessel, were issued so
late that their execution was not practicable;
And whereas, after the escape of that vessel, the measures taken
for its pursuit and arrest were so imperfect as to lead to no re-
sult, and therefore cannot be considered sufficient to release
Great Britain from the responsibility already incurred;
110 NUSSBAUM, supra note 65, at 213.
II' JOHN W. FosTER, ARBITRATION AND THE HAGUE COURT 9 (1904).
112 Horst Blomeyer-Bartenstein, "Due Diligence," in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 138, 139 (R. Bernhardt ed., Elsevier Science 1987).
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And whereas, in despite of the violations of the neutrality of
Great Britain, committed by the '290,' this same vessel, later
known as the Confederate cruiser Alabama, was on several oc-
casions freely admitted into the ports of the colonies of Great
Britain, instead of being proceeded against as it ought to have
been in any and every port within British jurisdiction in which it
might have been found;
And whereas the Government of Her Britannic Majesty cannot
justify itself for a failure in due diligence on the plea of insuffi-
ciency of the legal means of action which it possessed;
Four of the arbitrators for the reasons above assigned, and the
fifth, for reasons separately assigned by him, are of opinion that
Great Britain has in this case failed, by omission, to fulfill the
duties prescribed in the first and the third of the rules, estab-
fished by the sixth article of the treaty of Washington.' 13
The United States claimed about $21 million in direct and $4 million in
indirect damages caused by the attacks of the Alabama and her sister Confeder-
ate raiders; the United Kingdom acknowledged only about $8 million in direct
damages.' 14 The arbitrators split the difference, ordering the United Kingdom to
pay the United States some $15,500,000.115 The full sum was proferred in Brit-
ish Treasury Bonds on September 9, 1873. The American receipt was framed
and hung in 10 Downing Street." 6
The Alabama arbitration was an exceptionally encouraging develop-
ment for American international law enthusiasts. Some years earlier, in 1865,
Lord Russell, the British Foreign Secretary, had refused to arbitrate the Alabama
claims on the grounds that the British government were "sole guardians of their
own honor."'1 17 The eventual success of the Alabama arbitration became the
most important popular demonstration of the period that it was possible for
powerful states to arbitrate important disputes and thereby avoid war. General
Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885), President of the United States during the Ala-
bama arbitration, was so encouraged by the tribunal's deeds that the old warrior
"3 The "Alabama" Claims and Award, 1872, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 713, 716-717
(Scott ed. 1906).
114 4 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON -- GENEVA
ARBITRATION 41-42 (1872).
115 W.W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1023, 1023-1027 (3d ed.
1971).
116 J.G. WETTER, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 170-171
(1979).
117 C.C. HYDE, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED
STATES 120 (1922).
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predicted "an epoch when a court recognized by all nations will settle interna-
tional differences instead of keeping large standing armies."' 18 David Dudley
Field turned to the Alabama proceedings to demonstrate the probability of the
eventual success of international arbitration. 19
We left Burritt in 1862, when, fearful that his antiwar protests made him
unpopular in Connecticut, he felt forced to quiet his pleas to arbitrate the Civil
War. In 1863, Burritt left America for England, where he trekked around the
countryside and wrote two books about his rambles. Later, he served (1865-
1869) as U.S. Consul in Birmingham, promoting inter alia assisted emigration
to the United States. 20
In 1870, Burritt finally returned to the United States after seven years in
England. Immediately, he joined the American Peace Society and Field in call-
ing for a new international conference. Indeed, it seems that the idea for a new
peace congress sprang from a meeting between Burritt and the Secretary of the
American Peace Society, Rev. James B. Miles, in 1870, when both were
stranded by a storm in New Bedford, Massachusetts.121 Though Burritt's health
did not permit him to cross the Atlantic again, Miles went to Europe to promote
the scheme. The European response being favorable, Americans gathered at
Field's house in New York on May 15, 1873. They resolved to organize a Con-
gress in Brussels in October and to constitute an International Code Committee
in the United States to muster American support.1
22
These resolutions led directly to the establishment, also in 1873, of the
Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations, an organi-
zation now known as the International Law Association. Unlike the continent's
Institut de Droit International, founded the same year but academically-oriented,
the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations in typi-
cal American fashion welcomed "to its membership, not only lawyers, but shi-
powners, underwriters, merchants, and philanthropists, and received delegates
from affiliated bodies, such as Chambers of Commerce and Shipping, and Arbi-
tration or Peace Sections, thus admitting all who are interested in the improve-
ment of international relations."''
23
The International Law Association was, in its own words, "the child of
Burritt":
118 CALVIN DEARMOND DAVIS, THE UNrrED STATES AND THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE
13-14 (1962).
119 David Dudley Field, International Law, 8 ALBANY L.J. 277, 279 (1873).
120 CURTI, supra note 82, at 150-151.
121 Id. at 152.
122 Kurt H. Nadelmann, International Law at America's Centennial: The International Code
Committee's Centennial Celebration and the Centenary of Field's International Code, 70 AM. J.
INT'LL. 519, 522-523 (1976).
123 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE, HELD AT BRUSSELS,
1873, AND OF THE SECOND CONFERENCE, HELD AT GENEVA, 1874, at v (1903).
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[T]he idea which led to the formation of our Association ema-
nated from America. It appears to have had its inception in the
fertile brain of that far-sighted worker for peace, Elihu Burritt,
"the learned blacksmith."'
' 24
Burritt's ethical commitment, alongside his tireless promotion, had led
to the world's first permanent international organization devoted to international
peace.
V. WOODROW WILSON AND THE FIGHT FOR THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
America's great expectations for an ethical international law reached
their apogee in th early 20 century. However, on June 28, 1914, Archduke
Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the throne of Austro-Hungary, and his pregnant
wife, the Archduchess Sofia, visited Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, then part of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. On the way from the railroad station to a recep-
tion at town hall, their car was hit by a grenade thrown by Serbian nationalists.
Though the Archduke and Archduchess were unhurt, frightened officials urged
the couple to leave Sarajevo as quickly as possible. On their way out of the city,
at a bridge where their car needed to slow down, the couple were attacked again.
This time one of the Serbs, Gavrilo Princip, armed with a handgun, assassinated
first the Archduchess and then the Archduke.
Austria-Hungary, in the words of Barbara Tuchman, "with the bellicose
frivolity of senile empires, determined to use the occasion to absorb Serbia as
she had absorbed Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1909.,,125 On July 23, 1914, Aus-
tria gave a 48-hour ultimatum to the Serbian government, which was accused of
aiding and abetting the terrorist group, Black Hand, that organized the assassina-
tions. When Serbia refused to fully comply with the ultimatum, Austro-
Hungary declared war on Serbia. Russia mobilized troops to support Serbia.
Germany, an ally of Austro-Hungary, declared war on Russia, and, en route to
attacking France, invaded Luxembourg and Belgium. France and Britain took
arms to defend Russia and Belgium. Arbitration, as urged by U.S. Secretary of
State, William Jennings Bryan, "failed entirely."1 26 The Great War began. Eight
million lives were lost.
The effect of World War I on the American tradition of international
law was overwhelming. Watching "civilized" Europe slip into such a dreadful
loss of life and treasure for so little good reason astonished Americans who
cared deeply about a better world. The nineteenth century tradition of American
international law, including the contributions of Kent, Dodge, Worcester, Ladd,
and Burritt, served as the foundation on which Americans, beginning in 1914,
124 Id. at iv-v.
125 BARBARA W. TUcHMAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST 71 (Ballantine ed., 1994) (1962).
126 NUSSBAUM, supra note 65, at 224.
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began to build new institutions for an ethical international law. As Europe's
armies began to kill millions, it was plain that though the promise of interna-
tional law in the nineteenth century had not been kept; it had become all the
more necessary to fulfill that promise as soon as possible.
First and foremost among Americans shocked by the Great War was
President Woodrow Wilson. Wilson must be acknowledged as the key Ameri-
can international law intellectual of his time, turning America from its bright
optimism about international law to a darker more challenging view of the dis-
cipline. Such a transition was, of course, a matter of some urgency. It was for
Wilson and his compatriots in the era of the two "Great" and terrible world
wars, 1914-1945, to try, as best they could, to pick up what were, by then, shat-
tered pieces of the discipline and, reassembling some bits and adding others,
struggle to create forms of international law that would somehow be meaningful
and effective in an awful period of ideological and military tumult.
Although no one would gainsay the nineteenth century American inter-
national lawyers their tremendous influence, Wilson ranks ahead of any of them
in terms of practical and philosophical impact. He was, after all, for eight years,
1913-1921, President of the United States. Moreover, Wilson was America's
only President whose previous career was, by and large, academic. Dauntingly
for any commentator, Wilson's recorded intellectual product is matched by few,
if any, other Presidents (Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Abraham Lin-
coln?). Wilson was, it seems, always generating books, articles, speeches, and
letters. Garry Wills argues that, for Wilson, writing, not academia, came first in
order of priorities; he "took academic jobs to support his writing."1 27 Even
when Governor of New Jersey and President of the United States, Wilson,
unlike most political leaders, could and did write copiously on his own. Wilson
seemed to be engaged in creative written expression much of the time, making
the available material penned by him impressively voluminous. I can only trace
a little of his intellectual story vis t vis international law.
Though Wilson long had an interest in international law, he was not at
first fascinated by it. Wilson's personal encounter with international law has, I
think, three phases: international law began as an academic side-line; developed
into a matter of deep concern; and eventually became a passion. These phases
are not, of course, water-tight categories. There was slippage amongst them.
However, I think they accurately reflect the course of Wilson's engagement
with international law. Though we mostly remember Wilson's third idealistic
phase and many today refer to some visions of international law and interna-
tional relations as being "Wilsonian," Wilson in his first two phases was not
himself really what we now call a "Wilsonian," but something else.
127 Garry Wills, The Presbyterian Nietzsche, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Jan. 16, 1992, at 3. "As a
young professor, Wilson wrote a prodigious amount, almost all of it frankly inspirational and
aimed at the widest public. His five-volume History of the American People was composed in the
1890s in the form of lavishly illustrated articles for Harper's. He was paid $1,000 for each article,
an unheard-of price at the time." Id.
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In his first phase, a mostly academic period, 1865-1913, Wilson dealt
with international law many times but was not apparently entranced. As a
Princeton professor, Wilson introduced a new course on International Law in
the Spring of 1892. It was not, however, absorbing. Arthur Link's editorial
notes to the Wilson Papers comment that in "[firequent references in his letters
to his wife ... indicate that Wilson was struggling to stay ahead of his classes."
More important than international law to Wilson was Jurisprudence, where Link
submits "Wilson worked hardest."'' 28 Despite this, Wilson in the 1891-1892
Princeton catalogue promised to offer International Law every other year, alter-
nating it with his course on Constitutional Law. 129 It seems though that this aca-
demic promise to teach international lasted only three years until 1894.30
Wilson's relative lack of interest in international law was shown in his
popular college textbook, The State, first published in 1892. Wilson rejected the
claim of international law to be real law. "International law is, therefore, not
law at all in the strict sense of the term. It is not, as a whole, the will of any
state: there is no authority set above the nations whose command it is.' 13 1 At
best, international law was "simply the body of rules, developed out of the
common moral judgements of the race, which ought to govern nations in their
dealings with one another."'
' 32
Such a limited vision of international law was conveyed, it appears, in
Wilson's lectures on Jurisprudence at Princeton. In one student's notes from
1897, for example, Wilson is recorded to have told his class that "[t]he law
which is produced by the society of the States and which we call International
Law ... is in part a body [of] Positive Morality, and in part a body of definite law
based upon contract, treaty and the laws of individual states."'' 33 Two years later
in 1898, Wilson is quoted as saying that "[t]here is no gov[ernment] to stand
behind international law;" instead, international law is "addressed to the con-
science and good faith of nations."'
' 34
Wilson, as an academic, never considered himself an international law-
yer nor did others think of him as such. So, we are not much surprised that
when the pre-eminent organization for American international lawyers, the
American Society of International Law (the "ASIL") was instituted in 1905, the
128 7 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 292 (A. Link ed. 1984).
129 Id. at 5.
130 THOMAS J. KNOCK, To END ALL WARS: WOODROW WILSON AND THE QUEST FOR A NEW
WORLD ORDER 8 (1992) [hereinafter KNOCK].
131 WOODROW WILSON, THE STATE 629 (1 st ed. 1892).
132 Id.
133 Woodrow Wilson, quoted in "Notes of James Lawson Norris on Woodrow Wilson Lectures,
1897-1899," handwritten notes, Jurisprudence Lecture VIII, Oct. 19, 1897, from the archives of
the Firestone Library, Princeton University.
134 Woodrow Wilson, quoted in "Notes of George L. Denny on Woodrow Wilson Lectures,
1899-1900," handwritten notes, Jurisprudence Lecture of Oct. 10, 1899, from the archives of the
Firestone Library, Princeton University.
2007]
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
well-known President of Princeton University, Thomas Woodrow Wilson, was
not there among the founders. And when, in 1907, the ASIL published the first
volume of what would quickly become America's premier international law
review, The American Journal of International Law (the "AJIL"), Wilson, again,
was nowhere to be found. Given his later importance to the field, one might
have expected Wilson to have been among America's international law great,
good and learned in the pages of the AJIL in 1907. He would have been in ex-
cellent company. To mention only a dozen of the more prominent figures who,
unlike Wilson, did publish in the first four issues of the AJIL, there were: Elihu
Root, the U.S. Secretary of State; 135 John W. Foster, formerly U.S. Secretary of
State and grandfather of a later U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles;
36
John Bassett Moore, Professor of International Law at Columbia University;
37
George B. Davis, Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army; 138 Amos S. Her-
shey, Professor of International Law at the University of Indiana; 139 Jacob B.
Hollander, Professor of Political Economy at Johns Hopkins University;
140
Robert Lansing, who would become Woodrow Wilson's second Secretary of
State; 14 1 Simeon E. Baldwin, Chief Justice and later Governor of Connecticut;
142
Paul S. Reinsch, Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin; 1
43
Albert Bushnell Hart, Professor of Government at Harvard University; 144 James
Brown Scott, Professor of Law at George Washington University;1 45 and
Charles H. Stockton, Rear Admiral in the U.S. Navy.' 46
Wilson's reluctance to take international law too seriously carried over
at least to his 1912 campaign for the presidency. Even when appearing before
135 Elihu Root, The Need of Popular Understanding of International Law, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 1
(1907); Elihu Root, The Real Questions Under the Japanese Treaty and the San Francisco School
Board Resolution, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 273 (1907).
136 John W. Foster, International Responsibility to Corporate Bodies for Lives Lost by Out-
lawry, 1 AM. J. INT'LL. 4 (1907).
137 John Bassett Moore, International Law: Its Present and Future, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 11 (1907).
138 George B. Davis, Doctor Francis Lieber's Instructions for the Government of Armies in the
Field, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 13 (1907); George B. Davis, The Geneva Convention of 1906, 1 AM. J.
INT'L L. 409 (1907).
139 Amos S. Hershey, The Calvo and Drago Doctrines, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 26 (1907).
140 Jacob B. Hollander, The Convention of 1907 Between the United States and the Dominican
Republic, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 287 (1907).
141 Robert Lansing, Notes on Sovereignty in a State, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 297 (1907).
142 Simeon E. Baldwin, The International Congresses and Conferences of the Last Century as
Forces Working Toward the Solidarity of the World, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 565 (1907).
143 Paul S. Reinsch, International Unions and Their Administration, I AM. J. INT'L L. 579
(1907).
144 Albert Bushnell Hart, American Ideals of International Relations, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 624
(1907).
145 James Brown Scott, The Legal Nature ofInternational Law, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 831 (1907).
146 C.H. Stockton, Would Immunity from Capture, During War, of Non-Offending Private
Property Upon the High Seas be in the Interest of Civilization?, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 930 (1907).
[Vol. 109
THE QUEST FOR AN ETHICAL INTERNATIONAL LA W
those well-disposed to hear good things about international law, Wilson was not
inclined to much praise the discipline. In a speech to the Universal Peace Union
in February 1912, Wilson was careful to caution his audience about the limits of
international law and international courts. A news account reported that Wilson
argued that it was important that countries achieve domestic harmony before
international peace could be realistically sought:
In the first part of the address Governor Wilson said that it was
necessary to carefully study the whole question and to endeavor
to ascertain whether we could clearly advocate peace. He said
that countries must first have industrial peace and justice within
the confines of the country before the question of international
peace should be discussed. He said that war was "clumsy and
brutal," and that we were steadily outgrowing such methods of
righting wrongs, but that all must gravely consider the question
of concession and equality before war could be abolished. He
characterized peace as a perfectly running machine with friction
practically eliminated, due to the perfection of construction.
The whole keynote of the address was the need for righting
wrongs, securing justice for the laborer, equity and right in each
country and international good will would necessarily follow.
147
However, When Wilson became President he began to take a very dif-
ferent view of international law. Perhaps to his surprise, the discipline became a
necessary part of his job. In Wilson's second phase, 1913-1917, as President of
the United States but before we entered the war, Wilson was suddenly deeply
concerned about international law, especially violations of it.
No sooner had the European war broken out than, on August 22, 1914,
Wilson's principal advisor, Colonel House, whom Wilson called "my second
personality ... my independent self', advised Wilson: "Germany's success will
ultimately mean trouble for us. We will have to abandon the path which you are
blazing as a standard for future generations, with permanent peace as its goal
and a new international ethics code as its guiding star, and build up a military
machine of vast proportions."'' 48 A few months later, Wilson, echoed House in a
speech to the American Bar Association, argued that, "[o]ur first thought, I sup-
pose, as lawyers, is of international law, of those bonds of right and principle
147 Woodrow Wilson, Address to the Universal Peace Union in Philadelphia (Feb. 19, 1912), in
24 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 181, 182 (A. Link ed.).
148 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, Woodrow Wilson: The Conservative as Liberal, in THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT 308, 340 (Vintage ed., 1974).
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which draw the nations together and hold the community of the world to some
standards of action.'
149
Faced with attacks on trans-Atlantic shipping by German U-boats, Wil-
son invoked "the whole fine fabric of international law" as justification for per-
mitting Americans, still neutrals in the combat, to travel on Allied shipping,
even the ill-fated Lusitania, sunk in the spring of 1915. Wilson wrote Senator
Stone that to do otherwise, international law "might crumble under our hands
piece by piece."'
150
When, on April 2, 1917, Wilson went to Congress for a declaration of
war against Imperial Germany, he entered into his third and final phase of in-
volvement with international law. Far from a subject of little interest, no longer
just a matter of anxious concern, international law became, for Woodrow Wil-
son, a passionate involvement. Indeed, the development of international law
became, for him, one of the chief justifications for the United States entering
into a bloody and much regretted war.
To understand Wilson's final passion for international law, it is neces-
sary to comprehend his personal anguish in launching the United States into the
horrors of Europe's Great War. And to understand that anguish, it is necessary
to remember Wilson's boyhood acquaintance with an equally awful conflagra-
tion, the American Civil War. Thomas Knock captures this as well as any:
Thomas Woodrow Wilson's earliest memory was of hearing, at
the age of four, that Abraham Lincoln had been elected Presi-
dent and that there would soon be a war. His father, the Rever-
end Dr. Joseph Ruggles Wilson, was one of Georgia's most
prominent Presbyterian ministers and, despite his Yankee heri-
tage, an ardent Southern sympathizer. Both of Wilson's parents
were Northerners; in the 1850's, they had moved from Ohio to
Staunton, Virginia (where Wilson was born in 1856), and even-
tually to Augusta, Georgia, where the Civil War overshadowed
Wilson's childhood. As his eighth birthday approached, he wit-
nessed the solemn march of thousands of Confederate troops on
their way to defend the city against Sherman's invasion. He
watched wounded soldiers die inside his father's church and
pondered the fate of the ragged Union prisoners confined in the
churchyard outside. Soon he would see Jefferson Davis paraded
under Union guard through the streets and would recall standing
"for a moment at General Lee's side and looking up into his
face.
149 Woodrow Wilson, Remarks to the American Bar Association (October 20, 1914), in 31
Papers of Woodrow Wilson 184 (Link ed. 1969).
150 HOFSTADTER, supra note 148, at 345.
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Wilson once commented, "A boy never gets over his boyhood, and
never can change those subtle influences which have become a part of him." It
is an important fact that he experienced, at an impressionable age, the effects of
a great war and its aftermath.
The son of a Presbyterian minister and a Presbyterian minister's daugh-
ter, Wilson, in the words of Richard Hofstadter, was reared "to look upon life as
the progressive fulfillment of God's will and to see man as 'a distinct moral
agent' in a universe of moral imperatives.' ' | 52 Wilson "never aspired to be a
clergyman, but he made politics his means of spreading spiritual enlightenment,
of expressing the powerful Protestant urge for 'service'. '',, 3 International law
became Wilson's mission.
The echoes of the Civil War and the powerful Protestant sense of moral
mission were plain two years after America's declaration of war when Wilson
went to the U.S. Senate looking for its advice and consent to the League of Na-
tions Covenant he had personally negotiated in Paris. He spoke of Congress's
assent to sending troops to fight in France:
Let us never forget the purpose - the high purpose, the disinter-
ested purpose - with which America lent its strength, not for its
own glory but for the defense of mankind. I think there is noth-
ing that appeals to the imagination more in the history of man
than those convoyed fleets crossing the ocean with the millions
of American soldiers aboard - those crusaders, those men who
loved liberty enough to leave their homes and fight for them
upon the distant fields of battle, those men who swung into the
open as if in fulfillment of the long prophecy of American his-
tory.
What a halo and glory surrounds those old men whom we now
greet with such reverence, the men who were the soldiers in our
Civil War! They saved a Nation! When these youngsters grow
old who have come back from the fields of France, what a halo
will be around their brows! They saved the world! They are of
the same stuff as those old veterans of the Civil War. I was born
and bred in the South, but I can pay that tribute with all my
heart to the men who saved the Union. It ought to have been
saved! It was the greatest thing that men had conceived up to
that time. Now we come to a greater thing - to the union of
great nations in conference upon the interests of peace. That is
the fruitage, the fine and appropriate fruitage of what these men
151 KNOCK, supra note 130, at 3.
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achieved upon the fields of France. I do not hesitate to say, as a
sober interpretation of history, that American soldiers saved the
liberties of the world.
Shall the great sacrifice that we made in this war be in vain, or
shall it not?
15 4
What would justify this great sacrifice? In answering, Wilson had, three
years earlier, invoked international adjudication with religious enthusiasm:
You know that there is no international tribunal, my fellow citi-
zens. I pray God that if this contest have no other result, it will
at least have the result of creating an international tribunal and
producing some sort of joint guarantee of peace on the part of
the great nations of the world.
155
Once the war began, Wilson went further, moving from merely advo-
cacy for an international tribunal, to the ideal of a full-fledged international gov-
ernment, the League of Nations:
If it be in deed and in truth the common object of the Govern-
ments associated against Germany and of the nations whom
they govern, as I believe it to be, to achieve by the coming set-
tlements a secure and lasting peace, it will be necessary that all
who sit down at the peace table shall come ready and willing to
pay the price, the only price, that will procure it; and ready and
willing, also, to create in some virile fashion the only instru-
mentality by which it can be made certain that the agreements
of the peace will be honored and fulfilled.
That price is impartial justice in every item of the settlement, no
matter whose interest is crossed, and not only impartial justice,
but also the satisfaction of the several peoples whose fortunes
are dealt with. That indispensable instrumentality is a League of
Nations formed under covenants that will be efficacious.
156
Wilson's transformation, an all-encompassing conversion to an ideal in-
ternational law, was remarkable. After years of doubt about the potential of in-
154 WOODROW WILSON'S CASE FOR THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 20-21 (H. Foley ed., 1922) [here-
inafter Wilson's Case].
155 Woodrow Wilson, Address in Des Moines, Iowa (Feb. 1, 1916), in James Brown Scott, AN
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at ii (Oxford Univ. Press 1916).
156 Woodrow Wilson, Address in New York (Sept. 27, 1918), in WOODROW WILSON'S OWN
STORY 284, 285 (D. Day ed. 1952).
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ternational law, he had become fully committed to an extreme form of the disci-
pline, a belief in world government. In arguing that "International Law [was]
Completely Changed,"15 Wilson wrote that "International law up to this time
has been the most singular code of manners. You could not mention to any
other government anything that concerned it unless you could prove that your
own interests were involved.... In other words, at present, we have to mind our
own business."' 158 But, once the United States joined the League of Nations,
Americans would be able to" mind other people's business and everything that
affects the peace of the world, whether we are parties to it or not. We can force
a nation on the other side of the globe to bring to that bar of mankind any wrong
that is afoot in that part of the world which is likely to affect the good under-
standing between nations, and we can oblige them to show cause why it should
not be remedied." 159 This was supra-nationalism, a remarkable imposition on
state sovereignty.
The apotheosis of Wilson's vision of an ethical international law came
in his famous Fourteen Points speech of January 8, 1918. This eloquent elabora-
tion of American War aims not only hastened the peace with Germany and the
other central powers, but charted an ethical course for international relations.
Along with Thomas Jefferson's 1776 Declaration of Independence, James
Madison's 1787 United States Constitution, and Abraham Lincoln's 1863 Get-
tysburg Address, Woodrow Wilson's 1918 Fourteen Points ranks, I believe, as
one of America's four most important public documents. It read in relevant part:
We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which
touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless
they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence.
What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is
that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made
safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own
life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the
other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peo-
ples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we
see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us.
The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that program,
the only possible program, as we see it, is this:
And some of its most remembered proposals:
I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there
shall be no private international understandings of any kind but
diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.
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II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside terri-
torial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may
be closed in whole or in part by international action for the en-
forcement of international covenants.
HI. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and
the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all
the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves
for its maintenance.
IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national arma-
ments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with do-
mestic safety.
V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of
all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the princi-
ple that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the in-
terests of the populations concerned must have equal weight
with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be
determined.
And most importantly:
XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under
specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guaran-
tees of political independence and territorial integrity to great
and small states alike.
In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and asser-
tions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the
governments and peoples associated together against the Impe-
rialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in pur-
pose. We stand together until the end.
For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight
and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only be-
cause we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable
peace such as can be secured only by removing the chief
provocations to war, which this program does not remove. We
have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in
this program that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or
distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have
made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish
to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or
power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with
hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate her-
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self with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in
covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only
to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world, --
the new world in which we now live, -- instead of a place of
mastery.
We have spoken now, surely, in terms too concrete to admit of
any further doubt or question. An evident principle runs through
the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice
to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal
terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be
strong or weak. Unless this principle be made its foundation no
part of the structure of international justice can stand. The peo-
ple of the United States could act upon no other principle; and
to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their
lives, their honor, and everything that they possess. The moral
climax of this the culminating and final war for human liberty
has come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their
own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the
test. 160
VI. CONCLUSION
As I began, so I conclude. I hope I have demonstrated that there was
nothing hypocritical about the commitments of these Americans - Kent, Dodge,
Worcester, Ladd, Burritt, and Wilson - to an ethical international law. Their
moral sentiment was, I believe, absolutely genuine. I do not deny that one could,
probably, equally well tell a tale of the commitment of other Americans to a
narrow practically positivistic utilitarian international law. That both strands are
woven into the fabric of the American tradition of international law, I do not
deny. But to those abroad who condemn us in the United States as having "no
real obligation to obey international law" or as being "imperial authoritarians"
or as "uncommitted to the tenets of international law," I answer - no, it has
never been all of us. Rather, many of us Americans have always stood, along
with James Kent, ready and eager to uphold the ethics of Grotius. Let us finish
with Kent's words and sentiment:
[J]ustice [is] of perpetual obligation, and essential to the well being of
every society.... [T]he great commonwealth of nations [stands] in need of law,
and the observance of faith, and the practice of justice.1 61
160 45 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 536 (A. Link ed., 1984).
161 KENT, AMERICAN LAW, supra, note 7, at 15.
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